Introduction

The Doha Round negotiations began in 2001 and the reasons of the current round’s failure can be found back then. A short review of the negotiations within the last decade will provide a complete outline given that if the last round is examined autonomously any conclusions would be as safe as any conclusions drawn on an iceberg by examining its top alone.

 

The Doha Round negotiations take place in the World Trade Organisation, one of the most important organisations of our time. Following World War 2 an institution was established known as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). This institution was intended to advance nondiscrimination in trade between states given that trade was considered important for peace and economic stability. The US is the largest trader worldwide and it was an original signatory of the GATT principles protecting free market. In 1995 the GATT was replaced by the World Trade Organization (WTO) which is currently the main global organization for world trade[1]. From 1948 to 1998 many states participating in the GATT and the WTO signed 12 multilateral trade agreements[2].

 

In this essay a WTO short presentation will follow, then a short description of the Doha Round from 2001 to 2011, and then an analysis of three main reasons of the Doha Round failure.

 

  1. The World Trade Organisation

 

At regular intervals WTO states negotiate in order to amend or form new rules. These negotiations are known as “rounds” and theoretically speaking “The broader the negotiations, the greater the possible trade-offs, and thus theoretically the greater the potential economic benefits to countries[3].

 

When deciding upon a matter, decisions are made by the states and not by WTO staff not by voting but by consensus. Important decisions concerning WTO policies are made by the Ministerial Conference, i.e. the political representatives who are usually trade ministers from every state. The Ministerial Conference meets every two years however, operational decisions are made by the General Council i.e. by representatives from every state who meet on a monthly basis[4]. Many WTO states are developing states.

 

Over the last fifty years liberalization of agriculture has changed the traditional world structure of food production based on family farming. In our time southern states support the consumption patterns of northern states by exporting raw materials and natural resources. Northern states mainly consisting of the US and the EU protect their productions and their domestic markets with high subsidies[5]. According to trade economists the reduction of trade barriers would allow a better products’ exchange thus encouraging economic growth. This is why multilateral negotiations are essential in order to reduce trade barriers[6].  

 

As it concerns the conclusion of new agreements the WTO has not been really productive. Its policies have not changed dramatically over the last ten years. So far there have been no agreements between the US, the EU, China and Japan, i.e. the four major economies of the world that jointly amount for more than half of world exports[7]

 

It has to be noted that fifty years ago many of the contemporary developing states were colonies. Today as independent states they are members of the WTO and their needs are different from the needs of the developed states. In 1999 developing states demanded the addressing of their interests and stated that if this did not happen they would not support any other round of multilateral negotiations. In 2001 the Doha round of negotiations began which was known as the Doha Development Agent (DDA) due to the demand of the developing states to serve their interests[8]. Its fundamental objective is to improve developing states’ trading prospects[9].

 

Before the Doha negotiations were conducted the Uruguay Round talks of the GATT preceded in 1986-1994 nonetheless the US wished to expand agriculture and services talks to accomplish larger trade liberalization. The WTO held its first Ministerial conference in Singapore in 1996 and formed working groups on trade facilitation and other issues however, no agreement was reached. The need for new trade negotiations seemed paramount and in 1999 in Seattle US a ministerial conference would start negotiations however, due to riots negotiations were decided to start on Doha Qatar in the next ministerial conference.    

 

  1. The Doha Development Round (2001-2011)

 

2.1. General remarks

 

The Doha Round is so far the latest round of negotiations on trade among the WTO states aiming to reform the international trade system by introducing low trade barriers and by revising several trade rules dealing with 20 trade areas[10]. If these negotiations were successful it is estimated that world trade would be benefited. This round of negotiations is the longest trade round in the history of multilateral negotiations[11]. Negotiations began in November 2001 in Doha at the WTO’s fourth Ministerial Conference providing the mandate for negotiations[12] on many issues concerning the implementation of present agreements[13] such as:

  • Agriculture
  • Non-agricultural market access (NAMA)
  • Services
  • Rules
  • Intellectual property: geographical indications and biodiversity
  • Trade and environment
  • Trade facilitation
  • Special and differential treatment
  • Dispute settlement
  • E-commerce
  • Jargon buster
  • Country groupings[14]

 

Of these issues three are the most important: agricultural domestic support, agricultural market access and nonagricultural market access (NAMA) which are characterized by Pascal Lamy, Director-General of the WTO, as the “triangle of issues[15].

 

The negotiations are conducted by five working groups and in other WTO bodies and they have been anything else but easy with many states unable to compromise. The EU and the US are in constant disagreements with China, Brazil and other developing states. This however does not mean that the EU and the US are always in good terms with one another.

 

The Doha round started in Doha in 2001, then it continued in Cancún Mexico in 2003, then in Geneva Switzerland in 2004, in Paris France in 2005 and in Hong Kong China in 2005, in Geneva again in 2006, in Potsdam Germany in 2007, in Geneva again in 2008 and in 2011. It would seem that the Doha round could be known as the “Geneva Round” since many negotiations took place there.

 

In Doha the states’ ministers decided to accept more or less 50 decisions on the developing states’ obligations as it concerns agriculture, subsidies, textiles and clothing, technical barriers to trade, trade-related investment measures and rules of origin, with many implementation issues of concern to developing states not settled in Doha, and so the ministers decided on a future work programme addressing these matters. A Ministerial Declaration was issued stating that: “negotiations on outstanding implementation issues shall be an integral part of the Work Programme in the years to come[16].

 

It seems that many issues are crucial to developing states, in addition to concessions on agriculture, e.g. an issue, resolved nowadays, involving compulsory licensing of medicines and patent protection[17]. However, at the Doha Round negotiations, achieving substantial liberalization of agricultural trade proved to be challenging[18].

 

2.2. Doha Qatar (2001)

 

The Doha Round begun in November 9-14 2001. It started a few months following September 11 terrorist attacks in New York and one of its main goals was to reduce farm subsidies and farm tariffs that the developed states had maintained following the WTO launch[19]. Following the 9/11 attack certain government officials asked for a greater political cohesion and in the light of a growing fear of that time the ministers met in Doha adopting three documents providing guidance for future actions[20]. The hopes were high within a rapidly changing world back then. Doha was strongly connected with the desires of the international community to demonstrate their commitment to work together in the 9/11 aftermath. It was believed that extensive international poverty served as a breeding ground for terrorism, so it was agreed that the Doha Round would be a “development round” in which “an agreement would harness trade to meet the pressing problems of global poverty and underdevelopment[21].

 

The Doha agenda was from the beginning relatively ambitious, including negotiations on too many issues[22]. The negotiations were complicated given the different opinions of the EU the US and of developing states on important subjects such as agriculture, industrial tariffs and non-tariff barriers, services, and trade remedies. The states agreed to work program for a new round of multilateral trade negotiations on agriculture and services. Initially negotiations were to be concluded by January 1 2005, nonetheless this did not happen. Developing states such as emerging superpowers (China, Brazil, India) wanted agriculture tariffs’ reduction and subsidies’ reductions in developed states, whereas the US and the EU were interested in accessing the developing states’ industrial and services’ sectors. However, both the EU and the US wanted to protect their own agricultural sectors[23]

 

2.3. Cancún Mexico (2003)

 

The 5th Ministerial Conference was held on September 10-14 2003 in Cancún, Mexico however, no agreement was reached there[24]. While the states intended to agree on more solid basis for negotiations everything collapsed within four days. “The fanfare of the WTO Ministerial Conference in Cancún, Mexico in September 2003 quickly turned into a disgraceful tumult of infuriation and fingerpointing[25].” Therefore, states decided they would conclude an all-inclusive agreement including a concessions’ balance at the end of the negotiations[26].

 

The Doha agenda was already ambitious and in 2003 the world was beginning to change with the G-20 formation where large developing states were included such as China, India, Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, Indonesia, Thailand and South Africa. In Cancún it became evident that the former dominance of the US, the EU, Japan and Canada was over. This situation caused a confrontation amid the developing states on one hand and US and the EU on the other hand[27]. It was unclear if some states came to negotiate or simply to state their opinion without being prepared to compromise on anything, and this is valid not only for developing states but also for developed states such as the US that denied to reduce their cotton subsidies whereas several developing states such as Africa’s Cotton Four (Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, and Mali) strongly requested this[28].

 

2.4. Geneva Switzerland (2004)

 

Following Cancún fiasco, negotiations resumed in May 2004 in Geneva Switzerland following US propositions.

 

In Geneva many developing states began negotiating with developed states and in July 31 2004 a package was worked out containing fundamental principles and framework establishing the modalities in future negotiations[29] and new trade facilitation negotiations began[30].

 

Moreover certain issues were removed from the Doha agenda seemingly facilitating negotiations. However the July 2004 package did not motivate WTO member states to compromise. The Doha agenda was revised still, the political climate was not mature for the alleged “July Approximation”. In essence the states had once more failed to resolve their differences[31]

 

2.5. Paris France and Hong Kong (2005)

 

Before meeting in Hong Kong the states wished to resolve certain issues in order to base negotiations on more solid basis, so they met in Paris in May 2005 however many disagreements came up on minor issues and there were concerns that on major issues disagreements would also follow.

 

In Hong Kong in December 13-18 2005 the sixth Ministerial Council was held. The original aim to agree on a modalities’ package was dropped and WTO members agreed on certain advancements in agriculture, industrial tariffs, duty and quota-free access for developing states however, ensuing attempts to achieve modalities have been fruitless[32].

 

 

 

 

 

 

2.6. Geneva Switzerland (2006)

 

Negotiations continued in Geneva in 2006 and again no agreement was reached on free trade or import taxes. In July 24 2006 a new collapse of the Doha Round was observed and for many it was no surprise[33].

 

It is true that every deadline has passed since the Doha Round launch in 2001 and the main reason for that arguably is owed to the fact that it is impossible today for “the world’s most powerful countries to write the rules of the global economy in favor of expanding their profit margins[34].

 

The US was blamed for the 2006 collapse given that it thought that developing states would not open their markets in the way they were asked to and thus discontinued the talks[35].

 

2.7. Potsdam Germany (2007) and Geneva Switzerland (2008)

 

In June 2007 negotiations were held in Potsdam Germany with no agreement again and with major differences among developed and developing states. In July 21 2008 again in Geneva the Doha Round negotiations continued with hopes and expectations and although it seemed that an agreement would be reached, many disagreements came up and the negotiations collapsed due to conflicting interests of the states involved. The EU Trade Commissioner described the collapse as a “collective failure[36] however India Commerce Minister commented that the negotiations’ failure should be viewed as a pause and not a collapse[37].

 

This failure according to Bouët & Laborde study would create “a potential loss of US$1,064 billion in world trade” and “the failure of the negotiations would prevent a US$336 billion increase in world trade…while a worldwide resort to protectionism would contract world trade by US$728 billion.”[38]

 

2.8. Latest developments (2009-2011)

 

Following yet another fiasco in Geneva in 2008 the Doha Round negotiations entered a dormant stage and though the G20 leaders promised that negotiations would be concluded in late 2010 there was no agreement whatsoever by October 2009, therefore the Geneva Ministerial Meeting in December 2009 ended fruitlessly.[39] In March 2010 no framework deal had been reached and the 2008 fiasco seemed as a recurring scene of the past[40].

 

Many developing states wished to reach an agreement and convince the US to participate in the negotiations actively, asking for deep cuts in agricultural tariffs and subsidies to remedy market distortions in agriculture however, the EU wanted to expand negotiations on investment, competition, government procurement and trade facilitation, calling in return along with the US for reductions in developing states’ industrial tariffs[41].

 

However, the economic crisis of 2008 made negotiations even harder, given that the states wished to protect their economies and not risk within economically unstable times. The WTO Director-General (DG) Pascal Lamy referred to 2011 as a “window of opportunity” in order to conclude the Doha round, nonetheless not many shared his optimism.[42] WTO states expressed dissatisfaction with the Doha Round’s current state, arguing that the ten-year negotiations resembled a “soap opera”. There was no agreement on what to include in the mini-deal proposed in late May 2011 and the Doha Round experienced yet another negotiations’ setback in late July 2011 that was reflected in Geneva in the eight Ministerial Conference, held on 15-17 December 2011[43]. The US WTO ambassador Michael Punke stated in July 2011 that a “so-called Early Harvest package is not happening and is not going to happen” and urged WTO negotiators not to spend more time on this effort, but rather “concentrate in the lead up to the December Ministerial on issues that look beyond the current Doha stalemate and forward to the future of the WTO itself[44].

 

In 2011 many insiders at the WTO in Geneva stated that a release of a revised set of negotiating texts in the Doha round was an essential condition in order to reach a deal by late 2011 however, the WTO DG pointed to “a clear political gap” which “is not bridgeable.[45] According to Claude Barfield “the possibility of a grand bargain that would produce major trade liberalization …has now disappeared”.[46]

 

2.9. Has the Doha Round failed?

 

The Doha Round seems to be the first failed trade round after WW2. According to Susan Schwab, former head of the U.S. Trade Representative office: “The Doha Round has failed. It is time for the international community to acknowledge this sad fact and move on.” Her conclusion is supported by all US business sectors and the U.S. Coalition of Service Industries Robert Vastine asked: “Why are we wasting our time?” According to Frank Vargo (National Association of Manufacturers): “the Doha Round has failed miserably in generating new market access.[47] This however does not mean that the WTO has also failed[48].

 

  1. Three main reasons for Doha Development Round failure

 

It is evident that the Doha Development Round has failed so far for many reasons however, three seem as the most significant:

  1. A)   The developing states’ growth
  2. B)   Irreconcilable states’ interests
  3. C)   Incorrect era

 

3.1. The developing states’ growth

 

The GATT i.e. the predecessor of the WTO was launched with 23 states in 1948, in 1979 during the Tokyo Round the GATT states were 90, in 1994 at the conclusion of the Uruguay Round they were 120 and currently WTO states are 153[49]. It becomes evident that the number of negotiating members adds constraints to the bargaining program[50] however, this was not the main reason of its unsuccessful conclusion, given that the nature of the member states has changed along with their numbers. The first GATT members were committed to a process of deeper integration and ongoing liberalization since the end of WW2 due to the end of the colonization era. The developing states i.e. in most of the cases former colonies do not share the same philosophy as their former Metropolis found at different development stages and consequently with diverse perceptions on global trade and national economic interests[51].

 

The Doha Round began ten years ago in a different global environment and can not deal with the agenda and objectives of the past[52]. When the Doha Round begun in 2001 the developed states dominated the world and the developing states had little to say. This reality currently belongs in the past and within the last decade the developing states could no longer sit and observe the decisions of other states[53] which in essence means that not only did the number of WTO member states grow, but that the number of real speakers also grew accordingly[54]. Kleiman argues that “the time for a successful conclusion to the Round has now passed…[55]

 

The Doha round could be considered as a symptom of a larger problem, which means that the negotiators’ stalemate mirrors the International system and not the WTO. In many regards the developed states do not wish to commit on anything without China, India and Brazil nonetheless, the developing triad along with other developing states feel that they are powerful enough to shape the system but do not associate their power with obligations; in essence Doha is but an aspect of a major problem[56].

 

3.2. Irreconcilable states’ interests

 

Sungloon Cho argues that the WTO states are split in two completely diverse worlds and this is the cause for the Doha Round unsuccessful completion[57]. He also argues that the developing states should mainstream open trade more aggressively as their primary developmental avenue.[58] It would seem that developed states’ governments lacked the political capital to bring the development cause to light without obtaining serious concessions from developing states[59]. Many argued that there was lack of political will, or that trade ministers involved from WTO member states within the last ten years have not been creative[60] as if all politicians of all WTO members in one decade were incompetent. Gresser argues that the problem is more systemic than personal, and this always seems to be the case. The systemic nature of the problem would be found in the irreconcilable interests of the WTO states. 

 

The Doha Round included in the first place an agenda of issues that the developed states wanted to avoid. Given that the Doha Round has always agricultural reform at its core, it seems that no state wishes agricultural reform with the exception of Brazil, Australia and some smaller states however, even Brazil has other priorities than agricultural reform i.e. its solidarity as a developing state. Other states such as Japan, Korea, China, India and the EU were negative and the US seemed as neutral at first[61]. Apart from agriculture the Doha Round was overloaded with too many other issues in the first place. According to Simon Evenett: “I see no basis for a deal… There are a small number of countries (notably the U.S.) who can’t do a low-ambition deal and a large number of countries that can’t do a high-ambition deal. Domestic developments in the main trading parties account for this outcome—until they change, the impasse continues.” [62] According to Olivier De Schutter the Special Rapporteur on the right to food “The world is in the midst of a food crisis which requires a rapid policy response. But the World Trade Organization (WTO) agenda has failed to adapt, and developing countries are rightly concerned that their hands will be tied by trade rules.”[63]

 

The negotiations insisted on an exchange i.e. that the developing states would open their markets for industrial products and the developed states would open their markets for agricultural products. The NAMA negotiations if they were signed it is estimated that they would reinforce the role of developed states as exporters of high-value goods and technology nonetheless, this would mean a problematic development of the developing states’ industrial sector given that their industrial products would not compete the developed states’ industrial products if tariff cuts and custom revenue was reduced. This would mean for developing states less money for essential public policies and the loss of millions of jobs if local industries unable to compete with developed states’ industries products were to close down[64]. It seems logical that agriculture has become the “linchpin” of the Doha Round, given that the US wants reductions in trade-distorting domestic support, elimination of export subsidies, and improved market access in both developed and developing states. The US seeks better market access for its industrial products in developing states[65]. These phenomena are not unknown in the EU where Members States of the south opened their markets to Member States of the north and the result was the loss of many of their local industries and long-term incapacitation of their economies in terms of independence contributing to their contemporary incompetence to deal effectively with the recession.

 

It seems that WTO states had different expectations that complicated the negotiations[66] and the stalemate may be attributed to the diametrically opposed perceptions of the Round between developed and developing states, whereas developed states are unaware of the original reasons for the Doha Round creation nonetheless, the real concern of the US and the EU is the growth of India, Brazil and China. This made them reluctant in reducing their farm protection unless these states reduced their industrial tariffs. On the other hand developing states perceive developed states’ consistent quid pro quo demands as unconscionable derelictions of Doha’s development mandate[67]. Developing states have complained on insufficient appreciation of the practical problems that they face in the implementation of new rules, moreover not all developing states are organized in similar terms allowing economic growth.[68] Moreover while the US is not able to live with a low-ambition deal, China, India, and Brazil cannot commit to elements of a high-ambition deal.[69]

 

Rodriguez argues that: “At the same time, the exchange of promises on the negotiations table between the agricultural and industrial sectors also caused disagreements in various positions adopted by different countries, even within more or less consolidated blocks. For example, the Czech Republic and Hungary in the European Union and Mercosur in Argentina had isolated positions in their respective blocks in the NAMA negotiations, giving priority to protecting their own domestic industrial production and thus creating outbreaks and differences within the regional integration processes. These are clear examples of the emergence of new interests, differences and contradictions among countries that go far beyond this point.”[70]

 

Although the Doha Round was intended as a development round the initial development focus blurred and faded[71]. Farm protectionism in the US and the EU entails enormous distortion in the global crop market beyond the level which might be remedied through occasional WTO litigation[72].

3.3. Incorrect era

 

The environment for trade talks is characterized as “sterile”. According to many internal political situations in WTO states such as the US, the EU and India have not been helpful when it comes to consider essential matters of international interest. Moreover the financial crisis that started in the US in 2008 and spread around the world made things even worse than they already were. Within this environment many politicians of major states argued against the Doha Round, e.g. the former French President Nicolas Sarkozy stated that the EU Trade Commission’s offer would destroy the European farm sector by reducing agricultural production by 20% and cutting 100,000 jobs[73].

 

The time was not right for major agreements not only because of the 2008 US crisis that spread in the EU affecting several member states within 2 years, but also because of China’s explosive trade growth by a factor of six, given that in 2001, China counted $266 billion US dollars in merchandise exports and $243 billion US dollars in imports however, by 2010 it rose to $1.6 trillion US dollars in exports and in $1.4 trillion US dollars in imports. In a world of more or less $12 trillion US dollars in goods exports this means a lot of shifts that industries and workers can not manage[74]. The Chinese growth was owed to policies that are against WTO principles such as high tariffs to keep out imports, significant subsidies and government intervention to promote exports et.c.[75] It strikes as odd that China joined in 2001 the WTO only to experience an economic miracle within the last decade by taking actions in contrast with WTO principles. Given the size of China alone it seems that the Doha round could not conclude successfully anyway. If China was reluctant to follow WTO principles why would the EU and the US compromise?

 

This fact coupled with the economic crisis in the EU and the US condemned the Doha Round in unsuccessful completion for the time being. Collateral damage to the world’s poor, such as the decrease of foreign direct investment and remittances, may last long after rich states start recovering economically.[76]

 

It seems that a new world has emerged nonetheless, the states are not yet mature enough to fully appreciate it. This immaturity caused a relevant comment by the WTO DG who stated that the states should: “fully engage in an ‘adult conversation’ over ‘what next.’” [77] However, maturity comes with time, and in that light it seems that the Doha Round began in the wrong time.

 

Conclusion

 

The WTO’s Director General, Pascal Lamy acknowledged that following a decade of negotiations the Doha Round is in “paralysis[78]. Instead of promised gains, during the decade that lapsed, economic conditions for the majority have deteriorated[79]. It seems that the more WTO members subscribe to the rhetoric of commercial bargains, the further they jeopardize the Doha Round[80]. As a result of this rather exhausting negotiation process, the global geopolitical map now seems more complex; given that the developing states do not wish to accept policies of “free” trade that have arguably favored large corporations’ interests[81].

 

Whether the unsuccessful conclusion of the Doha round is a bad thing or not is debatable. Some argue that the Doha Round was focused on an agenda misaligned with the real world and so its collapse may be a good thing[82]. Others argue that its unsuccessful conclusion matters to states like Mali, Togo and Burkina Faso that hope for agricultural reform in order to sell cotton or other farm products, or to states like Cambodia, Pakistan and Bangladesh specialising in urban garment industries[83]. The stalemate is also bad news for the exporting industries in all states such as the US, Australia, China, India et.c.[84]

 

It would seem that the Doha Round could not be completed successfully given that the WTO itself is merely an Organisation and not a more concrete Union like the EU. The EU constitutes a Union issuing Regulations and Directives and Member States are obliged to comply. Moreover the Member States are obliged to comply with EU principles such as free movement of persons, free movement of goods et.c. The WTO can not issue Regulations and Directives and its members have to agree and subsequently commit themselves. What would happen if the EU did not exist and the European states were negotiating via an Organisation of similar nature e.g. the European Trade Organisation? Would a ETO be successful where the Doha Round failed? Chances are slim although there are less dissimilarities between European states in comparison with the vast dissimilarities among American, African and Asian states. The only way the Doha Round would be successful according to my opinion is only when the time is right and this may be so in the future with the creation of a Union similar with the EU, i.e. with the creation of a Global Union. If such a Union existed there would be no Doha Round the way we know it and no “battle” would have been won or lost, because there would be no battle fought whatsoever, given that entrance in such a Global Union would automatically amount to the opening of all member states’ market, i.e. what the WTO with the Doha Round desperately tried to accomplish. In that light it seems that the WTO held a Round that was condemned to fail, given that the WTO itself is merely an Organisation basing its decisions in far too many constantly changing variants of far too many states. Even if the Doha round succeeds one day this will probably constitute a Pyrrhic victory and it remains to see what will follow next.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Appendices

 

Appendix I

 

Share of Agriculture and Food in Merchandise Exports for World and Developing Countries (1970-2003)[85]

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Appendix II

Trade and food security: issues of the Doha Round and beyond[86]

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

 

TEXTS

 

  1. Edited by Kym Anderson and Will Martin, Agricultural Trade Reform and the Doha Development Agenda, A copublication of Palgrave Macmillan and the World Bank, 2006,
  2. Sungjoon Cho, Associate Professor of Law and Norman and Edna Freehling Scholar, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology, The Demise of Development in the Doha Round Negotiations, TEXAS INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL, VOL. [45:573, 2010]

 

ARTICLES

 

  1.     Andrew Brown, Robert M. Stern, Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy, University of Michigan, International Policy Center, Achieving Fairness in the Doha Development Round, Global Economy Journal, Volume 5, Issue 4 2005 Article 23 Persectives on the WTO Doha Development Agenda Multilateral Trade Negotiations
  2.     Antoine Bouët and David Laborde, The Potential Cost of a Failed Doha Round, International Food Policy Research Institute, sustainable solutions for ending hunger and poverty, Supported by the CGIAR, IFPRI Issue Brief 56 • December 2008
  3.     Antoine Bouët, David Laborde, Why is the Doha Development Agenda Failing? And What Can be Done?, A Computable General Equilibrium-Game Theoretical Approach, IFPRI Discussion Paper No. 00877 July 2009, Markets, Trade and Institutions Division,
  4.     David Kleimann (EUI) and Joe Guinan (TransFarm Africa – Aspen Institute) Scientific Coordinator: Petros C. Mavroidis (Columbia University), The Doha Round: An Obituary, Global Governance Programme, ISSUE 2011/1 – June 2011
  5.     Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation, Geneva Office, Steffen Grammling, Program Officer (Trade and Development),WTO´s Doha Development Round in crisis: Squaring the “triangle of issues”, July 2006
  6.     Organization Negotiations: The Doha Development Agenda, Updated July 10, 2006
  7.     The WTO has failed developing nations, http://www.guardian.co.uk/global-development/poverty-matters/2011/nov/14/wto-fails-developing-countries

 

MISCELLANEOUS

 

  1. Cairns Group Farm Leaders’ Saskatoon Communique, 7 September 2011
  2. Ian F. Fergusson, Analyst in International Trade and Finance, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division CRS Report for Congress, World Trade Organization Negotiations: The Doha Development Agenda, Updated July 10, 2006
  3. Ian F. Fergusson, Specialist in International Trade and Finance, World Trade Organization Negotiations: The Doha Development Agenda, December 12, 2011
  4. International Business Statement on the Doha Development Agenra: Failure is Not an Option, January 15th 2007, Amcham EU •  Australian Services Roundtable • Business Council of Australia • Canadian Chamber of Commerce • Canadian Council of Chief Executives • Canadian Services Coalition • CNI • ESF • FIESP • General Chamber of Roc • Hong Kong CSI • KITA • NASSCOM • NFTC • NIPPON KEIDANREN • UNICE • USCIB • USCSI • Wellington Regional Chamber of Commerce
  5. World Trade Organisation, Understanding the WTO

 

INTERNET RESOURCES

 

  1. Alan Tonelson, The Real Lessons in the Doha Round’s Failure, August 15, 2006, http://americaneconomicalert.org/view_art.asp?Prod_ID=2537
  2. Anup Shah, WTO Doha “Development” Trade Round Collapse, 2006, http://www.globalissues.org/article/663/wto-doha-development-trade-round-collapse-2006
  3. Claude Barfield, It’s time to dump the Doha development round Real, Clear Markets, August 25, 2011, http://www.aei.org/article/economics/international-economy/trade/its-time-to-dump-the-doha-development-round/
  1. Dismay at collapse of trade talks, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/7532302.stm
  2. Doha Development Agenda, Briefing notes on some of the main issues of the Doha Round, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/dohaexplained_e.htm
  3. Doha Development Agenda, http://www.bis.gov.uk/policies/trade-policy-unit/trade-negotiations/doha-development-agenda
  1. Doha Development Round of multilateral trade negotiations, released 09 SEP 2011, http://www.fedfarm.org.nz/n3143.html
  2. Doha Development Round: Non-Agricultural Market Access, http://www.trade.gov/mas/ian/tradeagreements/multilateral/wto/tg_ian_002068.asp
  3. Doha Development Round Update: Round ‘Paralysed’, Conclusion Unlikely in 2011, http://www.forumsec.org/pages.cfm/economic-governance/geneva-office/doha-development-agenda-negotiations.html
  4. Ed Gresser, Doha: Heading for failure? Global Works Foundation, May 7th, 2011, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/05/07/doha-heading-for-failure/
  5. Graciela Rodriguez, IGTN Global Coordinator WTO negotiations: The success of Doha round failure.. July 2008, http://web.igtn.org/home/index.php?view=article&catid=3%3Atrade-negotiations-spotlights&id=2%3Alorem-ipsum-dolor-sit-amet&option=com_content&Itemid=125
  6. Jayati Ghosh, The Doha Development Round and Food Security in the Developing World,  May 04, 2011, http://www.networkideas.org/news/may2011/news04_Developing_World.htm
  7. Joseph Francois, Doha Round failure: This is the way the round ends…, 1 August 2008, http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/1502
  8. Lori Wallach and Deborah James, Why the WTO Doha Round Talks Have Collapsed, August 14, 2006 by CommonDreams.org, http://www.commondreams.org/views06/0814-33.htm
  9. Manel de Silva, Future of the Doha Development Agenda, http://www.ft.lk/2011/09/01/future-of-the-doha-development-agenda/
  1. Plan-B for saving Doha Development Round doesn’t mean ditching WTO’s other issues, TNC Rajagopalan / New Delhi Jun 06, 2011, http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/plan-b-for-saving-doha-development-round-doesnt-mean-ditching-wtos-other-issues/437924/
  2. Roland Lloyd Parry, Dismayed powers plea to salvage WTO talks, July 30, 2008, http://news.theage.com.au/world/dismayed-powers-plea-to-salvage-wto-talks-20080730-3myb.html
  1. Rupa Chanda, The Doha Development Round: Resurrected or in Limbo?, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125776151776038105.html
  2. Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food Olivier De Schutter, Upcoming trade talks must focus on right to adequate food, UN expert stresses, http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=40407
  3. Sten Tolgfors, India and the Doha Development Round, http://www.hindu.com/2007/09/03/stories/2007090355541100.htm
  4. Ten years of trade talks have sharpened divisions, not smoothed them, Apr 28th 2011, http://www.economist.com/node/18620814
  5. The Doha Declaration explained, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/dohaexplained_e.htm
  6. The Doha Round , http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/dda_e.htm
  1. The Doha Development Round of trade negotiations: understanding the issues, http://www.oecd.org/document/45/0,3746,en_2649_37431_35738477_1_1_1_37431,00.html
  2. The Doha “Development” Round: The World Trade Organization’s Controversial Agenda, http://www.globalization101.org/the-doha-%E2%80%9Cdevelopment%E2%80%9D-round-the-world-trade-organization%E2%80%99s-controversial-agenda-2/
  3. The Doha Round, For EU submissions to the WTO during the Doha Round, http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/eu-and-wto/doha
  4. The State of Food Insecurity in the World 2003, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations,  http://www.fao.org/docrep/006/j0083e/j0083e04.htm
  5. Will Martin, Aaditya Mattoo, Unfinished business? The WTO’s Doha Development Agenda, http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/7238

 

 

 

 

 

[1] Ian F. Fergusson, Analyst in International Trade and Finance, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division CRS Report for Congress, World Trade Organization Negotiations: The Doha Development Agenda, Updated July 10, 2006, at p. 4

[2] Ed Gresser, Doha: Heading for failure? Global Works Foundation, May 7th, 2011, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/05/07/doha-heading-for-failure/, accessed 30/03/12

[3] Ian F. Fergusson, op.cit.1, at p. 4

[4] Ian F. Fergusson, op.cit.1, at p. 4

[5] Graciela Rodriguez, IGTN Global Coordinator WTO negotiations: The success of Doha round failure.. July 2008, http://web.igtn.org/home/index.php?view=article&catid=3%3Atrade-negotiations-spotlights&id=2%3Alorem-ipsum-dolor-sit-amet&option=com_content&Itemid=125, accessed 25/03/12

[6] Ian F. Fergusson, op.cit.1, at p. 10

[7] Ed Gresser, ibid 2

[8] Ian F. Fergusson, op.cit.1, at p. 6

[9] The Doha Round , http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/dda_e.htm, accessed 1/04/12

[10] The Doha Round , ibid. 9

[11] Rupa Chanda, The Doha Development Round: Resurrected or in Limbo?, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125776151776038105.html, accessed 22/03/12

[12] The Doha Round , ibid. 9

[13] The Doha Declaration explained, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/dohaexplained_e.htm, accessed 15/04/12

[14] Doha Development Agenda, Briefing notes on some of the main issues of the Doha Round, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/dohaexplained_e.htm, accessed 22/03/12

[15] Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation, Geneva Office, Steffen Grammling, Program Officer (Trade and Development),WTO´s Doha Development Round in crisis: Squaring the “triangle of issues”, July 2006, p. 1

[16] The Doha Declaration explained, ibid. 13

[17] Ian F. Fergusson, op.cit.1, at p. 2

[18] Edited by Kym Anderson and Will Martin, Agricultural Trade Reform and the Doha Development Agenda, A copublication of Palgrave Macmillan and the World Bank, 2006, p. 295

[19] Sungloon Cho, Associate Professor of Law and Norman and Edna Freehling Scholar, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology, The Demise of Development in the Doha Round Negotiations, TEXAS INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL, VOL. [45:573, 2010], p. 577

[20] Ian F. Fergusson, op.cit.1, at p. 5

[21] David Kleimann (EUI) and Joe Guinan (TransFarm Africa – Aspen Institute) Scientific Coordinator: Petros C. Mavroidis (Columbia University), The Doha Round: An Obituary, Global Governance Programme, ISSUE 2011/1 – June 2011, p. 3

[22] David Kleimann (EUI) and Joe Guinan ibid. 21, p. 3

[23] Ian F. Fergusson, Specialist in International Trade and Finance, World Trade Organization Negotiations: The Doha Development Agenda, December 12, 2011, p.2

[24] Ian F. Fergusson, op.cit.1, at p. 6

[25] Sungloon Cho, op.cit at p. 578

[26] Ian F. Fergusson, op.cit.1, at p. 6

[27] David Kleimann (EUI) and Joe Guinan ibid. 20 at, p. 3

[28] Sungloon Cho, op.cit at p. 578

[29] Sungloon Cho, op.cit at p. 578

[30] Ian F. Fergusson, op.cit.1, at p. 2

[31] Sungloon Cho, op.cit at p. 579

[32] Ian F. Fergusson, op.cit.1, at p. 2

[33] Lori Wallach and Deborah James, Why the WTO Doha Round Talks Have Collapsed, August 14, 2006 by CommonDreams.org, http://www.commondreams.org/views06/0814-33.htm accessed 15/4/12

[34] Lori Wallach and Deborah James, ibid. 33

[35] Anup Shah, WTO Doha “Development” Trade Round Collapse, 2006, http://www.globalissues.org/article/663/wto-doha-development-trade-round-collapse-2006 accessed 15/4/12

[36] Dismay at collapse of trade talks, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/7532302.stm accessed 20/4/12

[37] Roland Lloyd Parry, Dismayed powers plea to salvage WTO talks, July 30, 2008, http://news.theage.com.au/world/dismayed-powers-plea-to-salvage-wto-talks-20080730-3myb.html accessed 23/4/12

[38] Antoine BOUËT and David LABORDE, The Potential Cost of a Failed Doha Round, INTERNATIONAL FOOD POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE, sustainable solutions for ending hunger and poverty, Supported by the CGIAR, IFPRI Issue Brief 56 • December 2008

[39] Sungloon Cho, op.cit at p. 582

[40] Sungloon Cho, op.cit at p. 574

[41] David Kleimann (EUI) and Joe Guinan ibid. 20 at, p. 1

[42] Ian F. Fergusson, op. cit 25, p.2

[43] Doha Development Round Update: Round ‘Paralysed’, Conclusion Unlikely in 2011, http://www.forumsec.org/pages.cfm/economic-governance/geneva-office/doha-development-agenda-negotiations.html, accessed 21/4/12

[44] Claude Barfield, It’s time to dump the Doha development round Real, Clear Markets, August 25, 2011, http://www.aei.org/article/economics/international-economy/trade/its-time-to-dump-the-doha-development-round/, accessed 22/04/12

[45] Ten years of trade talks have sharpened divisions, not smoothed them, Apr 28th 2011, http://www.economist.com/node/18620814, accessed 22/04/12

[46] Claude Barfield, ibid. 44

[47] Claude Barfield, ibid. 44

[48] Manel de Silva, Future of the Doha Development Agenda, http://www.ft.lk/2011/09/01/future-of-the-doha-development-agenda/, accessed 21/04/12

[49] Ed Gresser, ibid. 2

[50] Antoine Bouët, David Laborde, Why is the Doha Development Agenda Failing? And What Can be Done?, A Computable General Equilibrium-Game Theoretical Approach, IFPRI Discussion Paper No. 00877 July 2009, Markets, Trade and Institutions Division, p. 31

[51] Joseph Francois, Doha Round failure: This is the way the round ends…, 1 August 2008, http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/1502, accessed 20/04/12

[52] David Kleimann (EUI) and Joe Guinan ibid. 21 at, p. 2

[53] Manel de Silva, ibid. 48

[54] Graciela Rodriguez, ibid. 5

[55] David Kleimann (EUI) and Joe Guinan ibid. 20 at, p. 2-3

[56] Ed Gresser, ibid. 2

[57] Sungloon Cho, op.cit at p. 575-576

[58] Sungloon Cho, op.cit at p. 576-577

[59] Sungloon Cho, op.cit at p. 577-578

[60] Ed Gresser, ibid. 2

[61] Ed Gresser, ibid. 2

[62] David Kleimann (EUI) and Joe Guinan ibid. 20 at, p. 6

[63] Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food Olivier De Schutter, Upcoming trade talks must focus on right to adequate food, UN expert stresses, http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=40407, accessed 25/04/12

[64] Graciela Rodriguez, ibid. 5

[65] Ian F. Fergusson, op. cit 25, p.2

[66] Sungloon Cho, op.cit at p. 583

[67] Sungloon Cho, op.cit at p. 575

[68] Andrew Brown, Robert M. Stern, Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy, University of Michigan, International Policy Center, Achieving Fairness in the Doha Development Round, Global Economy Journal, Volume 5, Issue 4 2005 Article 23 Perspectives on the WTO Doha Development Agenda Multilateral Trade Negoatiations, p. 10

[69] David Kleimann (EUI) and Joe Guinan ibid. 21 at, p. 1

[70] Graciela Rodriguez, ibid. 5

[71] Sungloon Cho, op.cit at p. 583

[72] Sungloon Cho, op.cit at p. 585

[73] Sungloon Cho, op.cit at p. 586-587

[74] Ed Gresser, ibid. 2

[75] Lori Wallach and Deborah James, ibid. 33

[76] Sungloon Cho, op.cit at p. 587-588

[77] Doha Development Round Update ibid. 43

[78] Claude Barfield, ibid. 44

[79] Lori Wallach and Deborah James, ibid. 33

[80] Sungloon Cho, op.cit at p. 599

[81] Graciela Rodriguez, ibid. 5

[82] Joseph Francois, ibid. 51

[83] See more at Appendix I and II

[84] Ed Gresser, ibid. 2

[85] Edited by Kym Anderson and Will Martin, op.cit, at p. 4

[86] The State of Food Insecurity in the World 2003, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, p.22 http://www.fao.org/docrep/006/j0083e/j0083e04.htm, accessed 29/04/12